OpenID Connect authentication middleware for Traefik. Replaces forward-auth + oauth2-proxy. Auto-detects all major OIDC providers, validates ID tokens, manages sessions, and forwards user identity to downstream services.
| Provider | OIDC | Refresh | Auto-detected by |
|---|---|---|---|
| Full | Yes | accounts.google.com | |
| Azure AD | Full | Yes | login.microsoftonline.com, sts.windows.net |
| Auth0 | Full | Yes | *.auth0.com |
| Okta | Full | Yes | *.okta.com, *.oktapreview.com, *.okta-emea.com |
| Keycloak | Full | Yes | host containing keycloak, or /realms/ in path (covers KC <17 /auth/realms/ and 17+ /realms/) |
| AWS Cognito | Full | Yes | cognito-idp.*.amazonaws.com |
| GitLab | Full | Yes | gitlab.com |
| GitHub | OAuth 2.0 only — no ID token, no refresh | No | github.com |
| Generic | Full | Yes | any RFC-compliant .well-known/openid-configuration |
Authentication and claim extraction use the ID token. Ensure your provider includes required claims (email, roles, groups) in the ID token, not just the access token or UserInfo endpoint.
Enable the plugin in Traefik's static configuration:
# traefik.ymlexperimental:plugins:traefikoidc:moduleName: github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidcversion: v0.7.10
Then attach the middleware in your dynamic configuration (see Quickstart below).
This middleware tracks the current Traefik helm chart release. If it fails to load, update Traefik first.
Release checksums are signed with cosign keyless signing:
cosign verify-blob \--certificate-identity-regexp "https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/.*" \--certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \--bundle "traefikoidc_v<version>_checksums.txt.sigstore.json" \traefikoidc_v<version>_checksums.txt
apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1kind: Middlewaremetadata:name: oidc-authnamespace: traefikspec:plugin:traefikoidc:providerURL: https://accounts.google.comclientID: 1234567890.apps.googleusercontent.comclientSecret: urn:k8s:secret:traefik-oidc:CLIENT_SECRETsessionEncryptionKey: urn:k8s:secret:traefik-oidc:SESSION_KEYcallbackURL: /oauth2/callbacklogoutURL: /oauth2/logoutpostLogoutRedirectURI: /# forceHTTPS defaults to true (secure-by-default). Only set false if you# serve OIDC over plaintext HTTP for local dev.allowedUserDomains: [company.com]allowedRolesAndGroups: [admin, developer]excludedURLs: [/health, /metrics]
More example configs in examples/.
| Parameter | Description |
|---|---|
providerURL | Issuer URL (used for OIDC discovery). |
clientID | OAuth 2.0 client ID. |
clientSecret | OAuth 2.0 client secret. Supports urn:k8s:secret:ns:name:key. |
sessionEncryptionKey | Cookie encryption key, min 32 bytes. |
callbackURL | Callback path, e.g. /oauth2/callback. |
Full reference in docs/CONFIGURATION.md.
| Parameter | Default | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
forceHTTPS | true | Forces https:// in redirect URIs. Leave at default behind any TLS-terminating LB (AWS ALB, GCP LB, Azure App Gateway). Set false only for plaintext HTTP local dev. |
logoutURL | callbackURL + "/logout" | RP-initiated logout path. |
postLogoutRedirectURI | / | Where to send users after logout. |
scopes | appended to openid profile email | Extra OAuth scopes. Set overrideScopes: true to replace defaults. |
excludedURLs | none | Prefix-matched paths that bypass auth. |
allowedUserDomains | none | Restrict to email domains. |
allowedUsers | none | Restrict to specific addresses (or claim values when userIdentifierClaim != email). |
allowedRolesAndGroups | none | Require any of these roles/groups from ID-token claims. |
roleClaimName / groupClaimName | roles / groups | For namespaced claims (Auth0). |
userIdentifierClaim | email | Use sub, oid, upn, or preferred_username for users without email. |
enablePKCE | false | PKCE on the auth code flow. |
cookieDomain | auto | Set explicitly for multi-subdomain setups (.example.com). |
cookiePrefix | _oidc_raczylo_ | Unique prefix per middleware instance to isolate sessions. |
sessionMaxAge | 86400 | Session lifetime in seconds. |
refreshGracePeriodSeconds | 60 | Proactively refresh tokens this many seconds before expiry. |
rateLimit | 100 | Requests/sec. Min 10. |
logLevel | info | debug, info, error. |
audience | clientID | Custom access-token audience (Auth0 custom APIs). |
strictAudienceValidation | false | Reject mismatched audiences. Set true in production. |
allowOpaqueTokens / requireTokenIntrospection | false | Accept opaque access tokens via RFC 7662. |
disableReplayDetection | false | Disable JTI cache. Use Redis instead for multi-replica. |
allowPrivateIPAddresses | false | Permit private-IP providerURL (internal Keycloak, etc.). |
minimalHeaders | false | Reduce forwarded headers (mitigates HTTP 431). |
stripAuthCookies | false | Strip OIDC cookies from backend hop (mitigates HTTP 431). |
caCertPath / caCertPEM | none | Trust an internal CA for the provider's TLS. |
insecureSkipVerify | false | Local dev only. Disables TLS verification, logs a security warning. |
enableBackchannelLogout / backchannelLogoutURL | false / none | OIDC Back-Channel Logout (server-to-server). |
enableFrontchannelLogout / frontchannelLogoutURL | false / none | OIDC Front-Channel Logout (iframe). |
redis | disabled | See docs/REDIS.md. |
dynamicClientRegistration | disabled | See docs/DCR.md. |
forceHTTPS defaults to true, so redirect URIs always use https://. This is
the right default behind AWS ALB, GCP LB, Azure App Gateway, or any LB that
terminates TLS — X-Forwarded-Proto is unreliable (ALB may overwrite it).
Only set forceHTTPS: false when you actually serve OIDC over plaintext HTTP
(local dev). See issue #82.
Each replica keeps its own in-memory JTI cache → false positive "token replay detected" when the same token hits different replicas. Two options:
disableReplayDetection: true (loses replay protection).For IdP-initiated logout (back/front-channel) in multi-replica setups, Redis is required so a logout on one instance invalidates sessions on the others.
Each instance must use a unique cookiePrefix and sessionEncryptionKey,
otherwise a session minted by one instance can grant access through another.
See issue #87.
Either the ID token or the chunked OIDC cookies overflow your backend's header buffer. Combine these as needed:
minimalHeaders: true # drop X-Auth-Request-Token et al.stripAuthCookies: true # strip _oidc_raczylo_* cookies on the backend hop
Cookies remain in the browser; only the Traefik→backend hop is affected. See #64, #122.
If the provider's TLS cert is signed by a private CA (self-hosted GitLab, internal Keycloak, ADFS):
caCertPath: /etc/ssl/certs/internal-ca.pem# or, inline:caCertPEM: |-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----...-----END CERTIFICATE-----
Both can be combined. An unparseable bundle fails the plugin at startup. See #125.
APITraefik reserves TRAEFIK_API_*. User vars whose name contains API (e.g.
OIDC_ENCRYPTION_SECRET_API) make the plugin fail with
invalid handler type: <nil>. Rename to anything without the literal API
substring. See #98.
Forward identity to backends via Go templates over ID-token claims and tokens:
headers:- name: X-User-Emailvalue: "{{{{.Claims.email}}}}"- name: Authorizationvalue: "Bearer {{{{.AccessToken}}}}"- name: X-User-Rolesvalue: "{{{{range $i, $e := .Claims.roles}}}}{{{{if $i}}}},{{{{end}}}}{{{{$e}}}}{{{{end}}}}"
Available bindings: .Claims.<field>, .AccessToken, .IdToken,
.RefreshToken. Names are case-sensitive (.Claims, not .claims).
Escape with quadruple braces. If you see
can't evaluate field AccessToken in type bool, Traefik's YAML parser ate your{{ }}. The fix that actually works is{{{{ }}}}— the YAML pass turns it into{{ }}for the Go template engine. Other escaping tricks (literal blocks, single quotes) do not work reliably.
When a request is authenticated, the middleware sets:
| Header | Notes |
|---|---|
X-Forwarded-User | User's email (always). |
X-User-Groups | Comma-separated. |
X-User-Roles | Comma-separated. |
X-Auth-Request-User | User's email. |
X-Auth-Request-Redirect | Original request URI. |
X-Auth-Request-Token | Full ID token — the largest header; suppressed by minimalHeaders. |
Plus security headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options,
X-XSS-Protection, Referrer-Policy) controlled by the securityHeaders
section — see docs/CONFIGURATION.md.
| Symptom | Cause |
|---|---|
Token verification failed | Wrong/unreachable providerURL, or clock skew. |
Session encryption key too short | sessionEncryptionKey is < 32 bytes. |
No matching public key found | JWKS endpoint down, or kid mismatch. |
Access denied: Your email domain is not allowed | User's domain not in allowedUserDomains. |
Access denied: You do not have any of the allowed roles or groups | Claims missing or not in allowedRolesAndGroups. |
can't evaluate field AccessToken in type bool | Template not escaped — use {{{{ }}}}. |
tls: failed to verify certificate: x509: certificate signed by unknown authority | Internal CA — set caCertPath / caCertPEM. |
invalid handler type: <nil> | Env var name contains API — rename it. |
false positive replay detected | Multi-replica without Redis — see Multi-replica deployments. |
| Google sessions expire after ~1h | Consent screen still in "Testing" mode. Do not add offline_access — Google rejects it; the middleware sets access_type=offline automatically. |
Provider-specific issues (Keycloak mappers, Azure AD group overage, Auth0 namespaced claims, Cognito regions, GitLab self-hosted) live in docs/PROVIDERS.md.
Set logLevel: debug to surface detail.
See LICENSE.